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ARGUMENT
I.

A L L EVIDENCE OFFERED B Y OSGUTHORPE ATTACKING THE VALIDITY OF THE
1966

DOCUMENT IS ADMISSIBLE.

Enoch Richard Smith, as personal representative of the estate of Enoch Smith,
Jr. (collectively "Smith"), contends that "most of the 'facts' [set forth by Osguthorpe]
contain[] information that the trial court deemed barred by the Statute of Frauds and the
parol evidence rule." Appellee's Brief at 1. Smith concedes that portion of
Osguthorpe's Statement of Facts in paragraphs 3 and 7, that in "1966 the record title to
the Property was in the name of D. A. Osguthorpe." Appellee's Brief at 5, U 13. Smith
contends that the remainder of paragraphs 3 and 7, and all of Osguthorpe's Statement
of Facts, paragraphs 4 through 9, and 11 through 19, are inadmissible by virtue of the
Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. See Appellee's Brief at 5, Tj 13.

A.

The Statute of Frauds Does Not Preclude Osguthorpe's Proffered
Evidence.

The Statute of Frauds could not apply to the facts offered by Osguthorpe to
controvert Smith's claim that he or the Oral Partnership, was the owner of the real
property rather than Osguthorpe. Osguthorpe obtained fee title via a signed deed,
dated March 29, 1958, and recorded in the official records of the Summit County
Recorder on April 1, 1958. R. 272; see also April 27, 2000 Affidavit of Mary Katherine
Johnston, R. 273-277, and attachments thereto. This fact is not contested by Smith.
Thus, Osguthorpe's claim to title is founded upon a document, in the form of a recorded
warranty deed, that meets the requirements of the Statute of Frauds to prove his
ownership.

1
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The further evidence offered by Osguthorpe is not offered for the purpose of
showing that any estate or interest in real property has been "created, granted,
assigned, surrendered or declared . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. To the contrary,
the evidence is offered to defeat Smith's claim of any estate or interest in the real
property that was clearly owned by Osguthorpe under the deed Osguthorpe received in
1958. That evidence may be summarized as evidence (1) that Osguthorpe never
intended or agreed to make his real estate a part of the assets of the Oral Partnership;
(2) that Osguthorpe never signed, delivered or recorded any deed transferring
ownership of the subject real estate from him to the Oral Partnership or any other
person while the Oral Partnership was in existence; (3) that the assets of the Oral
Partnership consisted solely of sheep and cattle and no real property; and (4) that the
sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership were grazed on a variety of properties,
owned by Osguthorpe, Smith and others. See Appellant's Opening Brief, Statement of

Facts ffll 2 - 9.
Those proffered facts do not fall within the ambit of the Statute of Frauds, in that

*

they do not purport to establish an interest of Osguthorpe, but rather they refute Smith's
apparent contention that Osguthorpe's real property was transferred, either to Smith or
<

to the Oral Partnership. The Statute of Frauds does not apply to Osguthorpe's
evidence offered to defeat Smith's claim, whether of ownership or any other interest in
Osguthorpe's real property. The Utah Supreme Court has quoted Professor Williston's

(

statement of the purpose of the Statute of Frauds:
It is the intent and purpose of the Statute of Frauds to give to the
party to an oral contract against whom the enforcement of the
contract is sought by the other party the right to avail himself of the
2
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I

provisions of the Statute as a defense to his liability.
Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1992) (quoting 3 Samuel Williston, A
Treatise On The Law Of Contracts, § 530, at 746 (3d Ed. 1960)). The purpose of the
Statute of Frauds does not, therefore, extend to allow its interposition to preclude the
admission of evidence attacking the validity of a contract. Here, Osguthorpe is not
seeking to enforce the 1966 Document, so the Statute of Frauds does not come into
play. Smith argues that the Statute of Frauds bars Osguthorpe's evidence of the Oral
Dissolution Agreement. Osguthorpe's evidence, however, establishes that the Oral
Dissolution Agreement included no real property, since the Oral Partnership never
owned any real property. Thus, the Statute of Frauds does not apply.

B.

The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Exclude Evidence Offered To
Attack The Existence Of A Valid Contract.

In Nielsen v. M.F.T Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 (Utah 1982), plaintiff sought to
rescind a lease of computer equipment for failure of consideration. See id. at 455.
Plaintiff executed a signed acknowledgment of delivery upon receipt of computer
equipment. See id. Plaintiff introduced evidence that, despite his execution of an
acknowledgment of delivery, the equipment identified by serial number in the lease
agreement was not the same as the equipment delivered. See id. When plaintiff
received notice that the defendant who delivered the computer equipment was not the
owner as represented, plaintiff sent a letter of rescission to the sublessor, who
supposedly was leasing from that defendant. See id. at 455-56. The sublessor
appealed the trial court's admission of parol evidence on the issue of failure of

3
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consideration. Justice Stewart, in a unanimous opinion for the Utah Supreme Court,
held that such evidence "attacks the very existence of the contract for the purpose of
proving it unenforceable. [Citation omitted.] Such evidence does not contravene the
parol evidence rule." Id. at 456.
If neither Smith nor the Oral Partnership owned any interest in Osguthorpe's real
property, that fact undermines the existence of any consideration flowing to Osguthorpe
in the 1966 Document. The Utah Court of Appeals has stated: "Even if a written
agreement appears to be completely integrated, parol evidence is admissible to
establish whether there was consideration for a promise." Miller v. Archer, 749 P.2d
1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Soukop v. Snyder, 6 Haw. App. 59, 709 P.2d
109, 113 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 218(2)
(1981))). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 218(2) (1981), provides in pertinent
part:
Evidence is admissible to prove whether or not there is
consideration for a promise, even though the parties have reduced
their agreement to a writing which appears to be a completely
integrated agreement.
Id. § 218(2). Comment e to § 218 expressly states: "An incorrect statement of a
consideration does not prevent proof either that there was no consideration or that
there was a consideration different from that stated." Id. § 218, comment e.
Here, Osguthorpe has introduced evidence showing: (1) Osguthorpe was, at all
material times, the record fee title owner of the real property; (2) he never intended to
convey, nor did in fact convey, the real property or any estate therein to Smith, the Oral
Partnership, or any other person; (3) the Oral Partnership never owned any real
4
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property; (4) the dissolution agreement for the Oral Partnership was oral, and had been
fully performed before the time the 1966 Document had ever been signed; (5) there
were no disputes existing between Smith and Osguthorpe at the time of signing the
1966 Document; and (6) there was nothing left to do by way of dissolution of the Oral
Partnership at the time the 1966 Document was signed. Osguthorpe's testimony in that
regard is uncontroverted, so as to allow him summary judgment in his favor establishing
an absence of any consideration to support the 1966 Document.1 Even if summary
judgment were not granted in favor of Osguthorpe, his testimony clearly raises genuine
issues of material fact as to whether any real consideration was given to him,
precluding summary judgment against him.

C.

The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Bar Evidence To Clarify Whether
The 1966 Document Was In Fact Intended To Declare A Transfer Of
Osguthorpe's Real Property.

Even if the evidence submitted by Osguthorpe to show that there was no valid
agreement for a lack of any consideration were not admitted for that purpose, it would
clearly be admissible to clarify whether the 1966 Document was intended in any way to
transfer or declare a transfer of any interest in Osguthorpe's real property to Smith or to
the Oral Partnership.

1

Smith argues that the ostensible existence of a lawsuit by third parties
against both Smith and Osguthorpe somehow shows consideration flowing from the
1966 Document, because "resolution as between Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe of that
'dispute' is sufficient consideration." Appellee's Brief at 18. A claim by third parties is
not a "dispute" between Smith and Osguthorpe. The 1966 Document purports to have
D. A. Osguthorpe indemnify and hold Smith harmless from that litigation, but that
consideration flows to Smith, not Osguthorpe, and no evidence was presented that a
dispute existed between the two of them.
5
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Smith argues that the 1966 document "unambiguously declares that the Property
is property of the partnership." Appellee's Brief at 15. A studied examination of the
1966 Document itself, however, reveals the incorrectness of that argument. Even the
Appellee's Brief on page 15 shows that the 1966 Document is ambiguous. After baldly
asserting that the agreement "unambiguously declares that the Property is property of
the partnership^]" Smith goes on to argue that the document "recognizes and declares
that Smith[,]" and not the partnership, "had an ownership interest in the Property."
Appellee's Brief at 15. Osguthorpe already pointed out, in the Appellant's Opening
Brief at p. 25-28, that paragraph 1(g) that refers to the real property does not, itself,
purport to claim Osguthorpe's real property as partnership property.2 Instead,
paragraph 1(g) states that," in addition to the above-described property, [Smith]
agrees to sell to [D.A. Osguthorpe] his interest in the following described real property. .
. ." R. 9 (emphasis added). The 1966 Document thus purports to reference an interest
in real property in Smith, not the Oral Partnership.
Further, the 1966 Document does not even purport to declare the real property
to belong to Smith, but only contains a promise by Smith to sell his nebulous and
undefined interest in the real property. That is far from an unambiguous declaration by
Osguthorpe that Osguthorpe has ever conveyed any interest in his own real property to
Smith or to the Oral Partnership, or that the Oral Partnership or Smith in fact own the
real estate in which they are purporting only to transfer an "interest" to Osguthorpe. If
ever there were a need to resolve an ambiguity in a document, the1966 Document's
2

The description of the partnership's property is contained in paragraphs
1(a) through (f) of the 1966 Document. R. 8-9.
6
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language raises that need. Thus, since the 1966 Document is patently and palpably
ambiguous as to the facts and circumstances, all of the testimony proffered by
Osguthorpe is admissible.
To analyze the issue fully, it must be remembered that Smith contends that the
1966 Document meets the requirements of the Statute of Frauds "[b]ecause [the 1966
Document] declares that the Property is a partnership asset. . . ." Appellee's Brief at
19. That argument begs the question of whether the 1966 Document in fact does, or
was intended to do, any such thing.
As to the issue of whether the 1966 Document was intended to transfer, or
intended to declare a prior transfer of any real property, so as to meet the Statute of
Frauds, it is important to look at the very case cited by Smith, Guinand v. Walton, 22
Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 467 (1969). In Guinand, two partners in a partnership had
written a letter to Guinand and signed it, in which they stated: "This letter is to confirm
your ownership of an undivided ten per cent (10%) interest in WALTON-KEARNS, a copartnership, composed of Paul T. Walton and Thomas F. Kearns." 22 Utah 2d at 198,
450 P.2d at 468. First, the plain language of the letter clearly declared a specific
ownership interest in favor of Guinand in a partnership. Even there, however, parol
evidence was found to be admissible:
Inasmuch as the letter was silent on an important aspect of the
agreement, that is, what if anything the defendants received for
what they granted, the only fair and sensible thing to be done was
what the trial court did: admit other evidence to show what the
arrangement between the parties was.
22 Utah 2d at 199, 450 P.2d at 469. The letter itself clearly set forth an intent that
Guinand own ten percent of the partnership. Parol evidence was admissible to show
7
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whether there was consideration. Here, the 1966 Document does not even
unambiguously declare Smith to be the owner of the real property.
The 1966 Document describes only Smith as a putative grantor and Osguthorpe
as a putative grantee. It never purports to identify Osguthorpe as a prior grantor or
Smith as a prior grantee of Osguthorpe's real estate, and never identifies the "interest"
Smith purports to hold. Without these items, the 1966 Document, standing alone, as a
matter of law, cannot be construed to declare ownership in Smith of the real property.

<

See Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App. 82, fl 13, 999 P.2d 1244.3
In Warburton v. Virginia Beach Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals discussed how to determine whether a
document other than a deed effectuates a transfer of real estate. The Utah Court of
Appeals stated that "a real property interest may be transferred through other

{

documents and memoranda revealing an intent to transfer an interest in real property."
Id. at 781. The court described an important factor to consider in ascertaining the intent
of the parties to an agreement purportedly transferring real property as "whether the
document sufficiently describes the interest granted 'in a manner sufficient to construe
the instrument as a conveyance of an interest in land.' [Citation omitted.] Words that
'clearly show intention to grant an easement are sufficient, provided the language is
certain and definite in its term."' Id. at 781-82. Citing to the Restatement of Property,
the Court of Appeals stated that "some degree of definiteness in the scope or extent of

(

3

"In determining whether a document purports to convey an interest in
land, the court must 'focus[] on the document to see whether it identified the grantor,
the grantee, and the interest granted or a description of the boundaries in a manner
sufficient to construe the instrument as a conveyance of an interest in land.'" Id.

<
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an interest is essential to its recognition as a property interest." 899 P.2d at 781-82.
The 1966 Document does not purport to describe the "interest" Smith purports to
sell to Osguthorpe and, therefore, a fortiori, does not purport to describe any real
property interest purportedly declared to have been previously conveyed to Smith by
Osguthorpe. As such, the 1966 Document is ambiguous.
While Smith argues that a partner may contribute property to a partnership
without transferring title, citing to Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-7, that legal point is immaterial
where Smith has offered no evidence to establish any intention on the part of
Osguthorpe to transfer title to his real estate to the Oral Partnership, or any actual
transfer. This is discussed in more detail on pages 28-30 of Appellant's Opening Brief,
and will not be repeated here. In sum, the uncontroverted evidence establishes a right
to summary judgment in favor of Osguthorpe. At a minimum, it precludes summary
judgment in favor of Smith.

II.

SMITH'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT O N ALIENATION
A R E WITHOUT MERIT.

In response to the Osguthorpes' straightforward argument that the 1966
Document is an unreasonable restraint on alienation, Smith states that "[t]he 1966
Document says that if D. A. Osguthorpe leases the Property for more than $1.60 per
acre per year, he and Smith 'shall share equally' in the lease revenues. The
Osguthorpes say that this straightforward provision is a restraint upon alienation."
Appellee's Brief at 31. This is a gross mischaracterization of both the 1966 Document
and the argument raised by the Osguthorpes in their opening brief. For example, the
actual language of the 1966 Document is far broader than Smith admits, and provides:

9
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In the event, however, that Second Party or his successor or
successors in interest during the lifetime of the survivor of First
and Second Parties, plus twenty-one (21) years, in a good faith
transaction, shall sell the property, or any part thereof at a price
exceeding Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per acre, plus the
depreciated costs of any fencing that Second Party may have
caused to be done on the property, then First Party shall share
equally with Second Party in the sales price paid over Twenty
Dollars ($20.00) per acre, plus said depreciated fencing cost, and
if, during said period of time he, or his successor or
successors in interest in the property shall lease all or any
part of the property, for any period of time commencing during
said retained interest period, at a price in excess of $1.60 per
acre per year, First Party, shall share equally in the excess
rental over the $1.60 per acre per yean
1966 Document at 3-4 (R. 9-10) (emphasis added).
Smith seems to suggest that the cases cited in the opening brief are legal
anomalies. But those cases actually reiterate long-established real property law. This
provision of the 1966 Document is what the courts have long referred to as a "quarter
sale." See, e.g., U.S. v. 397.51 Acres of Land, 692 F.2d 688, 691 (10th Cir. 1982) ([a]
"quarter sale" is a device of feudal origin whereby a conveyee of land is required to pay
to the conveyor, or some other person, a portion of the sale price upon a later
conveyance of the land") (citing "Vol. VI, American Law of Property (1952) § 26.68, p.
512-15; DePeysterv. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 57 Am.Dec. 470 [1852]; Arzee Supply Corp.
v. Silverman, 31 Misc. 2.d 168, 220 N.Y.S. 2.d 3,4 [1961]; and Kowalsky v. Familia, 71
Misc. 2.d 287, 336 N.Y.S. 2.d 37, 41 [1972]")).
With respect to such provisions, the law is clear that "[q]uarter sales are unlawful
restraints on alienation." Id. at 692 (citing Vol. IV, American Law of Property (1952), §
26.88, pp. 512-515. See also Girard v. Meyers, 39 Wash. App. 577, 585, 694 P.2d
678, 683 (1985) (finding that although a provision which imposes an "obligation to pay
10
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an 11 percent commission or to pay an 11 percent price discount does not prevent a
sale, it discourages a sale because the owner does not receive full value for the
property" and is therefore an unlawful restraint on alienation); Dunlop v. Dunlop, 144
Va. 297, 309, 132 S.E. 351, 354 (1926) ("It is manifest that David Dunlop, Jr., would be
greatly restrained in his right of alienation if, in the event he undertook to make a sale of
the property he would forfeit a large amount of the purchase money. While this is not a
complete denial of the right of alienation, it is clearly a restraint upon that right, which
does not come within any of the exceptions named by Mr. Minor in his book on real
property referred to above, or in the other authorities. It is a restraint through the
requirement of the forfeiture of a part of the purchase money in case of a sale. This is
illegal and constitutes a condition repugnant to the absolute estate just given, and,
therefore, the condition embracing that restraint is void.").
The same analysis applies with respect to the provision requiring a splitting up of
lease payments in the event the property is leased for more than $1.60 per acre. The
1966 Document purports to require both D. A. Osguthorpe and subsequent owners of
the property to split lease payment profits with Smith. Such a provision, although not
necessarily preventing all sales of the property, clearly discourages any sale of the
property because a prospective purchaser would be required to split lease profits with
Smith. Such a provision is repugnant to the concept of fee title, and is an unlawful
restraint on alienation.
Smith argues that this Court should affirm the trial court's opinion because Utah
law allegedly does not recognize the invalidity of indirect restraints on alienation.
However, contrary to Smith's arguments, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly
11
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adopted the concept of indirect restraints on alienation. For example, in Page v. Page,
394 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1964), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledges the concept of
indirect restraints on alienation as it stated:
[o]ne who owns land by legal title in fee cannot by any provision of
the instrument of conveyance to him, nor by provisions of a later
instrument.... be restrained from alienating the property even for
a limited time, whether by language of naked prohibition or by a
condition or a limitation over in case of alienation made.
394 P.2d at 613 (quoting 42 A.L.R. 2d § 6, p. 1290 (emphasis added). More recently,
the Utah Supreme Court has defined an indirect restraint on alienation as follows:
[a]n indirect restraint on alienation arises when an attempt is made
to accomplish some purpose other than the restraint of alienability,
but with the incidental result that the instrument, if valid, would
restrain practical alienability.
Redd v. Western Savings & Loan Co., 646 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah 1982) (quoting L.
Simes and A. Smith, The Law of Future Interest, § 1112 (2d Ed. 1956)). Morever, and
consistent with the law in other jurisdictions, the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear
that indirect restraints on alienation of property are invalid and unenforceable if they are
not "reasonably necessary to protect a justifiable or legitimate interest of the parties."
Redd, 646 P.2d at 765 (finding that a "due on sale clause" was an indirect restraint on
alienation, but was enforceable because such a clause is "reasonably necessary to
protect a justifiable or legitimate interest of the parties.").
Here, as in Girard v. Meyers, supra, the quarter-sale provision of the 1966
Document serves no legitimate purposes. It protects no interest of Smith, and serves
only to inhibit and discourage development and sale of the property. Thus, the result
Smith asks this Court to reach is exactly the type of result the rule against unreasonable
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restraints on alienation is designed to prevent. As the Michigan Court of Appeals stated
in LaFond v. Rumler, 226 Mich. App. 447, 574 N.W.2d 40 (1997),
The addendum calls for the parties to split the profits from any sale.
. . . The addendum, although bargained for by the parties, goes
unreasonably beyond protecting the defendant's interest in insuring
payment under the original land contract... the ramifications of
the provisions remain and unduly impair the ability of the plaintiff to
convey her interest in the property in the future. As the trial court
noted, the addendum drafted by defendant does not restrict
plaintiffs rights to sell the property, but it does restrict her right to
sell the property at the price she chooses. That the plaintiff at her
own expense, undertakes improvements on the property, upon
resale she would not fully reap the monetary benefits of those
improvements because of the requirement that a percentage of the
resale profit be given to defendant.
574 N.W.2d at 44-45. See also White v. White, 105 N.J. Super. 184, 192, 251 A.2d
470 (1969) ("Here the owner has put substantial funds of his own into the property.
Certainly it would not be equitable to have two-thirds of those sums go to others upon a
sale within 15 years.").
Here, just as in the numerous cases cited above, the 1966 Document restricts D.
A. Osguthorpe's right to sell the property at the price he chooses. For example, if D.A.
Osguthorpe, at his own expense, undertakes to make improvements on the property,
upon resale he would not fully reap the monetary benefits of those improvements
because of the requirement that a percentage of the resale profits be given to Smith.
Even worse, the same evil would exist with respect to a subsequent owner of the
property. Thus, the 1966 Document clearly is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Smith's attempts to distinguish the LaFond and White cases ignore the
fundamental policy reasons that the law prohibits unreasonable restraints on alienation,
and ignore the actual language of the 1966 Document. Contrary to Smith's assertion,
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the 1966 Document does not simply require D.A. Osguthorpe to pay a percentage of
lease profits. Rather, it purports to require D. A. Osguthorpe, as well as subsequent
owners of the property, to split not only lease payments, but also sale profits, with
Smith. This type of a "quarter-sale" provision is clearly unenforceable as an
unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Finally, the one case upon which Smith relies, Broach v. City of Hampton,
Arkansas, 283 Ark. 496, 677 S.W.2d 851 (1984), is simply not applicable. That case
did not involve an unlawful "quarter-sale," as is involved in the 1966 Document.
Further, the Broach court noted that the disputed language did not contain any
language that indicated "that the parties intended that the terms would be binding
beyond the lives of the Broaches[,]" and, unlike this case, the provision was not binding
upon subsequent owners of the property. Broach, 677 S.W.2d at 854.
The 1966 Document contains an unlawful quarter-sale provision. It is repugnant
to the concept of fee title and, as a matter of law, constitutes an unreasonable restraint
on the alienation of the property that should be declared void as a matter of public
policy.

III.

B Y T H E T E R M S O F T H E 1966

DOCUMENT, OSGUTHORPE O W E S SMITH NOTHING.

Smith offers no substantial response to Osguthorpe's argument that the 1966
Document expressly provides that, so long as Osguthorpe uses the real property as
grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep or cattle business,
Osguthorpe shall have the right to possession and use of the property without
compensation to Smith. Smith simply points to the next sentence in the 1966
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Document, which says that if Osguthorpe or his successor sell or lease all or any part of
the property, Smith will share equally in the excess rental. Since a leasehold carries
with it an exclusive right of possession, Osguthorpe could not continue his ranching
operation on any leased land.
Here, Osguthorpe has neither sold nor leased the property. In fact, he still
continues to use all of the property as grazing lands in connection with his operation of
a sheep and cattle business. Smith's counsel's assurance to Osguthorpe that
Osguthorpe would never have to pay Smith anything for as long as Osguthorpe used
the real estate for grazing for his sheep and cattle business is not barred by the Statute
of Frauds, nor by the parol evidence rule, because it in no way contradicts the 1966
Document. Instead, it is entirely in conformity with the plain language of the 1966
Document.
Because Osguthorpe still has the use of all of the real property as grazing lands,
and in fact uses all of the real property as grazing lands in connection with his sheep
and cattle business, he owes Smith nothing, and summary judgment should have been
granted in Osguthorpe's favor.
IV.

THE ASCU AGREEMENT DOES NOT GRANT ANY EXCLUSIVE RIGHT O F
POSSESSION AND THUS IS AN EASEMENT AGREEMENT.

Smith argues, from the trial court's December 15, 1999 Memorandum Decision,
that "it is uncontroverted that a portion of the disputed Property is in the possession of
[ASCU] who [sic] have built ski lifts and roads on it." Appellee's Brief at 24. Nothing,
however, allows ASCU exclusive possession to the exclusion of Osguthorpe. Certainly,
ASCU is completely able to use the roads and ski lifts it has built. But the ASCU
15
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agreement expressly allows Osguthorpe to continue to use his own real property, in its
entirety, for ranching, which he does.
Smith asserts that Osguthorpe's argument that a lease constitutes a right to
exclusive possession of another's land for a limited period of time "does not address the
issue of the joint use of land." Appellee's Brief at 24. Of course, the joint use of land is
something that occurs all the time, in an easement context, not a lease context. For
example, an easement holder allowed to use a road across his or her neighbor's
property to access his or her own property can use the easement at the same time as
the owner of the servient estate is using the road. Just as a utility easement allows a
utility company to erect a utility pole, that is not a lease of real property to the utility. It
is an easement and that is no different from the ASCU agreement with Osguthorpe.
Summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Osguthorpe.
V.

EVIDENCE O F THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN OSGUTHORPE AND ASCU

Is

NOT BARRED EITHER BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS OR THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE.

Smith has consistently attempted to mischaracterize and misrepresent the nature
of the contract between ASCU, on the one hand, and D.A. Osguthorpe, Osguthorpe
Family Partnership ("OFP"), and Stephen Osguthorpe, on the other hand. Smith's
efforts in this regard amount to nothing more than a Herculean effort, by a non-party to
that contract, to insist that no court look at evidence of what the parties to the contract
themselves say their contract really is.
Yet all parties to that contract, ASCU, on the one hand, and the Osguthorpes, on
the other hand, are in agreement that, in exchange for a single annual pre-payment by
16
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ASCU (at this time of $200,000) to the Osguthorpes, Osguthorpe and OFP will allow
ASCU certain use of the real property owned by OFP (formerly owned by D. A.
Osguthorpe), and also that, primarily, Stephen Osguthorpe, but also D. A. Osguthorpe
and OFP, shall provide certain services to ASCU, upon request by ASCU.
Smith's argument that "Osguthorpe's claim to a side oral agreement4 is also
barred by the Statute of Frauds (for which integration is irrelevant)!,]" Appellee's Brief at
28, is overcome by the fact that a signed writing exists that establishes the existence of
the agreement for purposes of the Statute of Frauds. The question is only one of the
full terms of the agreement.
Commencing with the July 28, 1997 modification, express reference is made in
the writing to issues surrounding the provision of services. For example, in the July 28,
1997 writing, Stephen Osguthorpe (not a party to this litigation), individually, is a named
party to the agreement. Stephen Osguthorpe is expressly required, in paragraph 1 of
that agreement, to "approve" the alignment of a road prior to construction. Likewise, in
fflf 2, 3 and 4 of that writing, Stephen Osguthorpe is required to give approval for certain
construction plans. The same is true in paragraph 8 of that agreement. In paragraph 9,
the document specifically states: "[ASCU] will include the Osguthorpes in their master
planning process." The agreement then concludes: "Both parties agree to work
together in good faith and to maintain open communications. [ASCU] accepts the
obligation to notice and seek approval from the Osguthorpes on any matters of change

Smith continues to mischaracterize the single, ASCU agreement for both
use of real estate and provision of services, calling the portion of that single agreement
relating to services an "oral side agreement."
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to their lands."
Likewise, in the August 10, 1998 modification, the agreement, again expressly
names Stephen Osguthorpe as a party. That writing again expressly states: "Both
parties agree to work together in good faith and maintain open communication." Smith
offers no explanation of how working together and approvals would be required if the
documents simply dealt with the use of real property, as he contends.
The Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, the president and managing director of ASCII,
provides further evidence of the overall scope of services and requirements for the
Osguthorpes to cooperate, as part of a single agreement. Mr. Carrig testifies in his
affidavit:
Although the Osguthorpe agreement [referencing the ASCU
agreement] specifically refers to the use of certain portions of the
Osguthorpe's real property by Wolf Mountain in exchange for an
annual payment of $100,000, it was my understanding from
discussions with Kenneth Griswold, the managing member of Wolf
Mountain, that the annual payment also included payment for
personal services rendered by D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen
Osguthorpe which were critical to the success of the master
planning and permit approval process for [ASCU].
Carrig Affidavit, U 4, R. 762 (emphasis added). Mr. Carrig continued:
On July 28, 1997, Les Otten, the president of American Skiing
Company, the parent company of ASCU, and I met with D. A.
Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe in a sheep meadow to
discuss various issues related to the Osguthorpe agreement,
including an expansion of the personal services provided by the
Osguthorpes under the Osguthorpe agreement. Specifically, we
asked Stephen Osguthorpe to continue to assist us with the
approval process for The Canyons Spa and to provide day-to-day
consultation on land use, planning and environmental issues as
well as political and community relations. We also asked Stephen
Osguthorpe to attend planning commission and county commission
meetings on behalf of ASCU. ASCU agreed to increase the annual
payment to $150,000 in consideration for the expanded use of the
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real property and the additional personal services to be provided by
the Osguthorpes.
At the conclusion of the discussion in the sheep meadow, we all
shook hands and returned to my office where I drafted the
amendment and clarification of the Osguthorpe agreement, which
was signed by the parties that same afternoon ("Amendment").
Because of the time constraints and the unique nature of our
relationship with the Osguthorpes, the Amendment is very brief and
does not include a detailed description of all of the personal
services to be provided by the Osguthorpes in consideration for the
annual payment of $150,000. Instead, it refers to the parties'
obligations to work together in good faith and maintain open
communication. ASCU never intended the Amendment to be a
complete recitation of all of the services to be provided by the
Osguthorpes in consideration for the annual
payment....
In August 1998, I met with D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen
Osguthorpe on two occasions to discuss a new ski lift and a further
expansion of the personal services to be provided by the
Osguthorpes. Thereafter, I drafted a second amendment to the
Osguthorpe agreement ("Second Amendment"), which was signed
by the parties on August 10, 1998. Again, the Second Amendment
is very brief and is not intended to be a complete recitation of all
[the] services to be performed by the Osguthorpes in consideration
for the annual payment.
Carrig Affidavit at ffif 5-7, R. 762-763 (emphasis added).
Stephen Osguthorpe, the other party to the ASCU agreement who is not a party
in this litigation, also submitted an affidavit, again outlining that the agreement was a
single agreement, containing both a use of real property and personal services
component. Stephen Osguthorpe's affidavit establishes that the payment was for both
use of real estate and services. See Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, dated January
26, 2001, R. 749-760. Since there is a single agreement and a writing subscribed by all
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parties thereto, the agreement satisfies any requirement of the Statute of Frauds.5
The Utah Supreme Court in Spears v. Warn 2002 UT 24,

P.3d

,

expressly reiterated the proposition that a trial "court [is] required to admit and consider
extrinsic parol evidence" on the question of integration of a contract, in determining
"whether the parties adopted the [instrument] as a final expression of their agreements."
Id. U 20. Accord Hall v. Process Instruments and Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026
(Utah 1995) ("Thus, before considering the applicability of the parol evidence rule in a
contract dispute, the court must first determine that the parties intended the writing to
be an integration. To resolve this question of fact, any relevant evidence is
admissible.")
Smith's citation to Glauser Storage LLC. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App. 141, 27
P.3d 565, is simply inapposite. There was no issue before the appellate court as to
whether the document there in question was an integrated agreement, so the only
inference available is that a finding had been made, and not challenged, of integration.
See Glauser, passim. That left only the second step of the parol evidence analysis for
the appellate court to answer, namely, that "parol evidence may be admitted only if the
court makes a subsequent determination [after determining integration] that the
language of the agreement is ambiguous." Hall, 890 P.2d at 1027. Because the
agreement in Glauser was found not to be ambiguous, parol evidence was
inadmissible. Glauser, 2001 UT App., at H 21.
Here, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to enter a finding based

5

As was pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief, at Point VI. B., Smith in
any event lacks standing to assert the Statute of Frauds.
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upon the uncontroverted evidence that the writings were not intended to be integrations,
and that the agreement entered into was broader than what was merely set forth in the
writing. Because the ASCU agreement here is not an integration, the parol evidence
rule does not apply. See Spears, 2002 UT 24 at U 19 ("This general rule [referring to
the parol evidence rule] applies only to integrated contracts, though.").
Smith's contention that the contract "fails for lack of definiteness[,]" Appellee's
Brief at 31, would cause the entire agreement between ASCU and the Osguthorpes to
fail. Again, Smith attempts to mischaracterize the portion of the ASCU agreement to
provide services as "a side agreement" rather than what it really is, an integral part of
the single agreement to provide both use of real estate and personal services each
year, in exchange for an annual pre-payment that pays for both. Whether ASCU makes
any effort to allocate the amount of its annual pre-payment is immaterial. The value
that the parties between them determined would be sufficient for both use of real estate
and provision of personal services is the price term. ASCU has no reason to allocate it
and the Osguthorpes are free to allocate it as they choose. The price term for the
ASCU contract, including personal services, at present, is $200,000. That price term is
not indefinite and certainly not unenforceable.

VI.

T H E TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE To REQUIRE JOINDER O F T W O PARTIES T O T H E

ASCU

CONTRACT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR; T H E C A S E M A Y N O T PROCEED

WITHOUT JOINDER.

Smith argues that the standard of review of the trial court's decision not to join
Stephen A. Osguthorpe and ASCU as parties is abuse of discretion, rather than
correction of error. While a trial court's determination to proceed if absent, necessary
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parties1 joinder is not feasible, under Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b), calls into play certain factors
for consideration by the court in the exercise of discretion, as to which an abuse of
discretion standard applies, Rule 19(a) allows no discretion on the issue of mandatory
joinder. Rule 19(a) states:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject of the
action shall be joined... .
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (emphasis added). A person
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties,
or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.

'

<

{

Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a).
Here, the trial court expressly found that "although they may not claim an interest
in the litigation in general, [ASCU] and Stephen Osguthorpe do have an interest with
respect to the September 13, 2000 Memorandum Decision [ruling that the entire annual
payment was for use of real estate, not provision of services]." R. 725. The contract
requires ASCU to pay $200,000 per year to all the Osguthorpes, Stephen included, in
exchange for both the use of real estate and the receipt of personal services. The
same contract requires Stephen Osguthorpe to provide personal services. The trial

<

court's ruling that the entire annual pre-payment was for the use of real estate, and
none for personal services, has therefore materially affected (1) ASCU's right to receive
i

services from Stephen Osguthorpe, and (2) Stephen Osguthorpe's right to receive a
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portion of the annual pre-payment for personal services he individually provides.
ASCU is in a position to claim, since it was not made a party, that it has already
paid for services, despite the trial court's ruling, and to seek to specifically force D. A.
Osguthorpe, OFP and Stephen Osguthorpe to provide services that ASCU contends it
has paid for, or sue for damages. ASCU is not bound by the trial court's ruling and, in a
separate action, it might obtain specific performance or otherwise subject the
Osguthorpes to multiple or inconsistent obligations. This situation is precisely the kind
of situation in which joinder is mandated and, if Smith refuses to join the necessary
parties, his action cannot proceed, and judgment should not have been entered against
defendants on damages.
Smith's apparent argument that Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127
(Utah 1990), requires defendants to join Stephen Osguthorpe and OFP as parties is not
well-taken. The Utah Supreme Court stated that if "Landes had been concerned about
the absence of the SBA, he could have included the SBA as a defendant in [his]
original complaint or he could have requested leave to amend . . . to add SBA as a
defendant." Id. at 1132 (emphasis added). So, too, could Smith in this case, join
Stephen Osguthorpe and ASCU as defendants to this case. Smith simply has refused
to do so. Osguthorpe, who has no claims to assert against ASCU or Stephen
Osguthorpe, is not required to join them. Further, the Utah Supreme Court's quoted
comment was not pertinent to its Rule 19 analysis. Such comment was made after the
Supreme Court had already held that the SBA was not a necessary party under Rule
19(a). If the SBA were determined to have been a necessary party under Rule 19(a),
"then joinder is mandatory." 795 P.2d at 1132.
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VII.

SMITH IS NOT " I N PRIVITY" WITH D. A. OSGUTHORPE WITH RESPECT TO THE

ASCU CONTRACT.
Even if, arguendo, the 1966 Document were a valid agreement, and it is not, any
privity Smith might have with D. A. Osguthorpe resulting from that agreement does not
place Smith in privity with Osguthorpe concerning any rights under the ASCU contract.
Smith is not a successor in interest to Osguthorpe's rights under that contract, by
assignment or otherwise, nor is Smith an intended third-party beneficiary to that
contract. Smith correctly cites Kaplan v. Shure Bros., 153 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1998), for
the proposition that: "privity of contract is the 'mutual or successive relationship to the
same rights of property.'" Id. at 418 (quoting Collins Co. Ltd. v. Carboline Co., 532
N.E.2d 834, 839 (III. 1988)).6 However, Smith is apparently confused in the application
of that definition. The "rights of property" that appertain to Osguthorpe's interest in the
ASCU contract is the right to be paid by ASCU, under that contract, not the 1966
Document. Because Smith is not an intended third-party beneficiary, nor an assignee
of any rights under the ASCU contract, Smith is not in privity with respect to that
contract. Unlike an assignee or third-party beneficiary, therefore, Smith would lack
standing to sue ASCU for a claimed breach of that contract. See generally 17A
Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 425 at 449-50 (1991) ("Ordinarily, the obligations arising out of
a contract are due only to those with whom it is made; a contract cannot be enforced by
a person who is not a party to it or in privity with it, except under a real party in interest
statute or, under certain circumstances, by a third-party beneficiary.")
6

The same definition of privity appears in Black's Law Dictionary, at 1079
(5th ed. 1979).
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Hence, Smith has no standing to assert the parol evidence rule or Statute of
Frauds concerning the ASCU contract. In any event, as has already been shown
above, neither the Statute of Frauds nor the parol evidence rule are a bar to the proof
of what the agreement is between ASCU and the Osguthorpes.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Osguthorpe's motion for
summary judgment in his favor and against Smith. Should this Court not provide that
relief, then the existence of genuine issues of material fact call for reversal of the trial
court's entry of summary judgment against Osguthorpe, and in favor of Smith, based
upon the facts in the record, and the case should be remanded for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
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